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Basel Committee issued a comprehensive set of regulatory measures to enhance the banking regulatory 
framework and strengthen supervision and risk management of banking sector. Based on Basel Accords 
Standards, banks are required to hold appropriate level of capital against unexpected losses or 






This paper focuses on the analysis of the main implications of Basel I and Basel II, based on risk 
sensitiveness due to credit risk, in Greek Banking System and assesses their effect per portfolio and 
per Bank in order to evaluate capital charges and to measure credit risk exposure. In this paper, an 
attempt is made to examine the effect of the Basel Accords on Greek Banks, which active in Greece, 
listed in the Greek stock market and supervised by Bank of Greece. In particular, after conducting a 
series of alternative scenarios of adverse events for various factors, the new capital requirements were 
estimated according to the standardized approach, introduced by the two existing Accords. In addition, 
the convergence or divergence of the approach for both Accords was evaluated as regards the 
evaluation of three “representative Banks”, each of which forms a “synthesis” of three categories of 
Banks (small, medium, large) to which the set of main Greek Banks was partitioned. A series results 
come up regarding the level of capital charges that the Banks hold, depending on the size of their 
portfolios, the type of their assets and the overall policy that is applied. Findings contribute that a 
benefit from capital requirements occurs due to credit risk, but may be hedged by capital requirements 
due to operational risk. The final level of capital requirements improvement may be accomplished by 
specific provisions allocation for loans that were defaulted. The findings from standardized approach 
application could assist the Greek Banking System in order to create reliable risk management, 
strategies, credit policies and a prudential framework for credit institutions. In particular, the model 
formed provides important information to analysts so that they can come up with immediate results 
concerning the change in capital requirements of a Bank during the transition from Basel I Accord to 
the Basel II Accord, based on the methodology followed. It will mainly provide information for 
supervisory reasons either internal information of the level of capital maintained depending on the 
nature activities and the risks, which are taken by a Bank. Scientific researchers who have been 
examined the impact of the Basel Accords on Greek Banks and especially in capital requirements as 
well as in Bank behaviour is very limited. Also, up to now, the impact of adverse events on the loan 
portfolios of the Greek Banking System has not yet been satisfactorily evaluated. 
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(RWA) and requires banks to hold appropriate level of capital against unexpected losses or exceptional 
events that may occur (minimum capital ratio of capital to RWA for all banks to be at 8%). Furthermore, 
supervisors determine whether banks have adequate process, which take into account risk profile and 
market and macroeconomic conditions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988; 1999; 2001a; 
2006a; Hendrichs and Hirtle, 1997; Bank of Greece, 1999; Santos, 2000). Banks are required to hold an 
appropriate level of capital in order to be able to deal adequately and effectively risk exposures that may 
arise from their business activities. The amount of capital requirements is determined, mainly, by the size 
and the structure of loan portfolio, the quality of which is quantified by certain parameters (probability of 
default, exposure at default, etc.) and the financial regulator who set the capital adequacy ratio of equity 
(percentage of risk weighted assets) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001a; 2001b; 2004). 
Banks should maintain adequate capital (equal to at least 8% of risk-weighted assets) beyond the 
regulatory minimum in order to cover unexpected losses and keep themselves solvent in a crisis (Jones 
and Mingo, 1999; Crouhy et al, 2000; Jackson, 2002). In order to determine capital requirements, on-
balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposures are weighted respectively with risk (based on Basel I and 
Basel II requirements). Basel I take into account only credit and market risk, while Basel II defines a 
minimum regulatory operational risk capital charge. While risk calculation based on the first Accord uses 
predetermined coefficients that correspond to each exposure (eg. classifies assets according to the level 
of risk associated with it, with a range from risk-free assets at 0% to risk assessed at 100%), the second 
Accord develops a more elaborate methodology which takes into account the factors that determine the 
degree (high or low risk) and, analogously, the level of exposure. While Basel I suggests the use of one 
approach (standardized approach (ST)), Basel II suggests the use of two approaches (standardized 
approach and internal rating based approach (IRB)). The application of standardized approach of Basel II 
presents similarities with respective approach of Basel I (calculation of risk based on supervision 
coefficients), but includes also factors for calculating the total results (delinquencies, collaterals, credit 
ratings etc.) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2003a; 2004; 2006a; Ayadi 
and Resti, 2004; Ozdemir and Miu, 2009). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision conducted data 
collection exercises (Quantitative Impact Studies) to assess the impact of Basel framework on banking 
system capital requirements. These studies were performed on a voluntary and confidential basis. The 
studies were repeated on semi-annual basis with end-December and end-June reporting dates in order to 
create reliable risk management strategies and prudential framework for credit institutions (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001c; 2002; 2003b; 2005; 2006b). Greek Banks, participated to the 
Quantitative Impact Study in 2003b where they used the standardized approach. However, up to now, the 
effects that will be brought upon the capital requirements of the Greek Banking System, the reserved 
capital for hedging the risks undertaken that have been calculated by the application of the standardized  
approach, have not been yet fully evaluated as to the existence, the extent and the magnitude of changes. 
Important issues, like which categories of Banks will be more affected, which parts of portfolios will 
have the major changes as to their size and  extent, what will be their degree of impact , etc., which do 
not only concern issues of a qualitative character, have not had the necessary quantitative corroboration.  
In this paper, we examine the effect of Basel I and Basel II Accords on Greek Banks, which are active in 
Greece, listed on the Greek stock market, and supervised by the central Bank of Greece. In particular, 
after conducting a series of alternative scenarios for various factors, which affects risk-weighted assets 
and capital requirements, according to Basel I and Basel II, standardized approach was assessed. In 
addition, the convergence/ divergence of the approaches for both accords were evaluated for each 
“representative Bank” (Bank 1, Bank 2 and Bank 3). A model was developed, based on the standardized 
approach for minimum capital requirements calculation set out by Basel I and II Accords and a series of 
simulation scenarios was applied. 
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2. Data and Model 
Our sample consists of 18 Greek Banks operating in business in Greece, listed in the Greek stock 
exchange supervised by the Bank of Greece and whose total assets correspond to about 80 - 90% of the 
assets of the entire banking sector in Greece. We are interested in the impact of banking prudential 
regulations on the banking system, specifically on bank capital. The banks in the sample were grouped 
into three separate groups based on the size of their assets. The application of the methodology developed 
by Hartigan (1975) and Bartholomew et al. (2002) led us to group banks in the following categories: (a) 
The category of the large banks which includes the four larger banks (Bank 1); (b) The category of 
medium size banks which includes the next four banks based on their size (Bank 2); (c) The small banks 
category which includes ten banks (Bank 3). 
The three representative Banks (Bank 1, Bank 2 and Bank 3) that are corresponding to the three 
categories Banks (Bank 1, 2 and 3) are differed in size, structure, capital structure and profitability and 
thus it is likely the transition to Basel II to have on these different effects. The model accepts aggregate 
data per portfolio type, type of collateral, degree of coverage of the risks taken with respect to the 
exposure etc. The data that feed the model are taken from balance sheets, annual and supervisory reports. 
From 2007 fiscal year balance sheets analysis of the three representative Banks, the 80%, 65% and 10% 
of the capital comes mainly from deposits and loans for Bank 1, 2 and 3, respectively, which based on 
their nature and characteristics are elements that generate costs. It should be mentioned that 2007 was a 
crucial period for Greek Bank System since, starting from August 2007; the financial crisis began to 
exert upward pressure on bank interest rates in the money markets of developed economies, while the 
monetary and credit magnitudes kept on exhibiting large increases. Table 1 displays all financial data for 
the three Banks (Bank 1, Bank 2 and Bank 3). 
Table 1. Basic Indicators Analysis by Bank 
 
Banks Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 
 
Assets (in EUR) 235.713.397.000 76.312.377.172 24.824.817.920 
 
Capital (α EUR) 16.907.423.000 381.616.4278 2.149.518.304 
Profitability 
Profit / Capital 17,72% 12,17% 9,47% 
Profit / Risk Weighted Assets 1,95% 1,03% 1,14% 
Net Interest Margin 3,04% 3,08% 2,63% 
Net Interest Income / Risk 
Weighted Assets 




Risk Weighted Assets / Total 
Assets 
65,21% 59,16% 72,24% 
Core Equity Ratio 9,67% 8,43% 10,86% 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 13,77% 9,31% 12,91% 
Provisions 
Adequacy 
Annual Provisions / Net Interest 
Income 
16,24% 20,46% 20,94% 
Accounting Provisions / 
Regulatory Provisions 
65,73% 96,74% 76,84% 
Non-Performing Loans net of 
Provisions / Regulatory Capital 
14,62% 46,07% 24,91% 
Regulatory Provisions Shortfall/ 
Regulatory Capital 
4,51% 3,65% 10,67% 
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The data set contains all loans in current and overdue status per asset class, accumulated provisions, 
parameters values, which Basel Accords and, hence, Bank of Greece imposes for estimating the credit 
and operational risk in order to calculate their capital adequacy. Moreover, data were classified per asset 
class (types of loans), product type, risk category, type of collateral, etc. Balance sheets, annual reports, 
and regulatory reports provide the data that are used in the model. Financial data and overdue appearing 
on the portfolios of Greek Banks, provisions and the values of the parameters, which the Basel Accords, 
and, hence, the Bank of Greece imposes for estimating the credit and operational risk as well as the 
calculation of the banking institutions capital adequacy. 
The model attempts to estimate the risk of lending in order to identify the corresponding capital 
requirements for banks credit risk and their capital adequacy. Since different types of assets have 
different risk profiles, weighting assets according to their level of risk primarily adjusts for assets that are 
less risky by allowing banks to discount lower-risk assets. Risk-weighted assets are calculated for all 
portfolios of the three banks, based on the type of the exposures and scenarios are applied were risk 
elements (such as exposure, profitability of default, failure to fulfill counterparty’s obligation etc.) are 
applied. Then capital requirements were recalculated based on new conditions (worsens or not). 
3. Standardized Approach 
3.1. Procedure for calculating the financial figures and ratios 
Under the standardized approach and based on predefined criteria, exposures were slotted into each 
respective regulatory category for each product line, due to capital requirements calculation. Basel II is 
more risk-sensitive than Basel I, since Basel I rules for calculating risk weighted assets reflected only to 
the economic risk of a transaction and on a limited extent. Furthermore, Basel II Accord bases credit risk 
weightings on a simple approach (ratings of external rating agencies) or on more sophisticated ones 
(banks’ own internal ratings). The tailored to the institution's risk profile, through more risk buckets and 
higher risk weights for standardized approach compared to standard risk weights that Basel I applied. In 
addition, in order to raise the quality and the level of the capital base, there is need to ensure that all 
material risks are captured in the capital framework. Moreover, general provisions should be created 
against the possibility of future losses for each exposure (collective or individual basis), as defined by the 
regulatory framework (Basel I and Basel II). For each Bank (Bank 1, 2 and 3) three scenarios were 
implemented, based on the extent of provision to default loans. The diversification of regulatory factors 
regards mainly: (a) Non default and default loans, (b) Retail and Corporate Banking, (c) Mortgage 
lending, depending on the collateral (LTV: Loan / Value). 
Regulatory ratios of non-performing loans are differed according to the rate of coverage by specific 
provisions that are calculated by each Bank and each exposure (eg. mortgage loan, car loan, etc.). 
Scenarios results for the three representative Banks are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4. It should also be 
mentioned that Basel II introduces capital requirements for operational risk, a risk category that was not 
explicitly addressed under the Basel I rules. 
3.2. Bank 1 
For the first representative Bank (Bank 1), the amount of assets is equal to € 235 billion, while the capital 
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Table 2. Bank 1 Risk Weighted Analysis per Portfolio (in thousands Euro) 
 Coverage 0% Coverage 31,58% Coverage 61,76% 
Portfolio Type RWA Basel I RWA Basel II  RWA Basel I RWA Basel II RWA Basel I RWA Basel II 
Small Enterprises 
(non-defaulted) 
20.317.708  20.317.708  20.317.708  15.238.281  20.317.708 15.238.281  
Small Enterprises 
(defaulted, Coverage<20%) 
750.144 750.144 513.249 769.873 286.855 430.283 
Small Enterprises 
(defaulted, Coverage>20%) 
-  -    139.350 139.350 272.523 272.523 
Large Corporate 
(non-defaulted) 
63.693.041 63.693.041 63.693.041  63.693.041  63.693.041 63.693.041 
Large Corporate 
(defaulted, Coverage<20%) 
2.447.626  2.447.626 1.674.665  2.511.998  935.972 1.403.958 
Large Corporate 
(defaulted, Coverage>20%) 
-  -   472.364 472.364 923.788 923.788 
Mortgage LTV < 75% 
(non-defaulted) 
15.017.733 15.017.733  15.017.733 10.512.413  15.017.733 10.512.413 
Mortgage LTV > 75% 
(non-defaulted) 
1.698.708 1.698.708 1.698.708  2.548.062  1.698.708 2.548.062 
Mortgage LTV < 75% 
(defaulted, Coverage<20%) 
519.390 519.390  355.366 710.733 198.614 397.229 
Mortgage LTV < 75% 
(defaulted, Coverage>20%) 
-  -  138.124  138.124 270.126 270.126 
Mortgage LTV > 75% 
(defaulted, Coverage<20%) 
72.598 72.598  49.671  149.015 27.761 83.285 
Mortgage LTV  >75% 
(defaulted, Coverage>20%) 
-  -  18.099   36.199 35.397 70.795 
Retail 
(non-defaulted) 
19.329.601   19.329.601  19.329.601 14.497.200  19.329.601 14.497.200 
Retail 
(defaulted, Coverage<20%) 
766.461 766.461 524.412 786.619 293.094 439.642 
Retail 
(defaulted, Coverage>20%) 
-  -  128.143 128.143 250.605 250.605 
Operational Risk -  11.738.371 -  11.738.371 -  11.738.371 
 
For the first scenario the coverage of each exposure was set equal to zero, based on relevant provisions, 
which indicates that in none of the loans that were defaulted, special provisions were over 20%. For this 
case, according to Basel I, the total weighted assets will be equal to € 124.6 million; while in Basel II will 
be equal to € 125 million. This difference in total risk weighted assets, on credit risk, is equal to € 817 
thousand. For Basel II approach, we have additional capital requirements, due to the operational risk 
considered in this approach. In "Small Business non-default loans" portfolio, in Basel II weighted assets 
are at 75%, while in Basel I at 100%, which reflects to a reduction that amounts € 5 billion. In non-
defaulted mortgage loans with low LTV (weighted assets for Basel II are equal to 35%, while in Basel I 
to 50%) lead to a benefit equal to € 4,5 billion. Finally, in non-defaulted consumer loans (weighted in 
Basel II are equal to 75%, while in Basel I to 100%) the benefit of this variation is equal to € 4,8 billion. 
On the other hand, an increase is appeared in risk-weighted assets in defaulted loans, with higher effect in 
corporate defaulted loans. Provisions coverage of those loans is less than 20% and the relative increase is 
equal to € 1,2 billion. The higher increase is due to operational risk and it is equal to € 11,7 billion. Based 
on all these changes a marginal increase of risk weighted assets (Basel II compared with Basel I) exceeds 
the amount of € 817 million, which corresponds to 0.66% of risk weighted assets based on Basel I. 
In the second scenario banks set aside more in provisions than they expected to lose, which lead to lower 
risk weighted assets. Increase of provisions coverage will result in a reduction of regulatory coefficients, 
which are applicable to defaulted loans. For the three categories of defaulted loans (retail, corporate and 
mortgage lending, with LTV <75% and consumer credit), same improvement is occurred as in the first 
scenario € 5 billion, € 4,5 billion and € 4,8 billion, respectively. For defaulted loans portfolios a 
significant improvement of 30% appears. Indeed, while defaulted loans for corporate portfolio in the first 
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scenario increased € 1,2 billion, in the second scenario the increase was € 837 million. In the second 
worst category of defaulted loans, mortgage defaulted loans are reduced from € 519 million to € 355 
million. This reduction in risk weighted assets of defaulted loans that occurred due to provisions 
coverage, lead to a variation of € -466 thousand, that is almost 0% percentage change. 
In the third scenario, the provisions that were set aside for non-performing loans over 20% were equal to 
61.76%. For the three major defaulted loan categories same set aside risk weighted assets occurs. In 
defaulted loans the decrease is higher as € 1,2 billion (Scenario 1) has reached € 468 million and € 519 
million (Scenario 1) to € 198 million. If a capital charge for operational risk covers unexpected losses due 
to operational risk, then risk weighted assets will decrease € 782 million that is 0, 63%. 
 
3.3. Bank 2 
For the second representative Bank (Bank 2), the amount of assets is equal to € 76 billion, while the 
capital is € 3,8 billion. Main findings for Bank 2 are summarized as follows: 
 
Table 3.  Risk Weighted Analysis per Portfolio (in thousands Euro) 
 Coverage 0% Coverage 45,42% Coverage 100% 
Portfolio Type RWA Basel I  RWA Basel II  RWABasel I RWABaselII      RWABaselI        RWABasel II 
Small Enterprises 
(non-defaulted) 
6.784.562 5.088.422 6.784.562 5.088.422 6.784.562 5.088.422 
Small Enterprises 
(defaulted,Coverage <20%) 
460.558 690.837 251.372 377.059 - - 
Small Enterprises 
(defaulted,Coverage >20%) 
- - 123.050 123.050 270.916 270.916 
Large Corporate 
(non-defaulted) 
12.787.654 12.787.654 12.787.654 12.787.654 12.787.654 12.787.654 
Large Corporate 
(defaulted,Coverage <20%) 
1.803.703 2.705.554 984.461 1.476.691 - - 
Large Corporate 
(defaulted,Coverage >20%) 
- - 500.647 500.647 1.102.263 1.102.263 
Mortgage LTV< 75% 
(non-defaulted) 
7.532.826 5.272.978 7.532.826 5.272.978 7.532.826 5.272.978 
Mortgage LTV< 75% 
(defaulted,Coverage <20%) 
392.653 785.306 214.310 428.620 - - 
Mortgage LTV< 75% 
(defaulted,Coverage >20%) 
- - 150.183 150.183 330.655 330.655 
Mortgage LTV> 75% 
(non-defaulted) 
690.148 1.035.222 690.148 1.035.222 690.148 1.035.222 
Mortgage LTV> 75% 
(defaulted,Coverage <20%) 
40.987,28 122.961 22.370 67.112 - - 
Mortgage LTV> 75% 
(defaulted,Coverage >20%)  
- - 14.697 29.394 32.358 64.716 
Retail 
(non-defaulted) 
5.891.266 4.418.449 5.891.266 4.418.449 5.891.266 4.418.449 
Retail 
(defaulted,Coverage <20%) 
524.531 786.797 286.289 429.434 - - 
Retail 
(defaulted,Coverage >20%) 
- - 126.128 126.128 277.693 277.693 
Operational Risk  4.049.826 - 4.049.826 - 4.049.826 
 
For the first scenario the coverage of each exposure after calculating relevant provisions (over 20%) was 
set equal to zero, which indicates that in none of the loans that were defaulted, special provisions were 
                                                                                                                                        Journal of 
                                                                                                                                         ISSN  
 
Volume 15, Issue 1 available at www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jrbem                                                     7| 
Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management 
                                                            E-ISSN: 2395-2210 
held over 20%. For this case, according to Basel I, the total weighted assets are equal to € 36 billion; 
while in Basel II are equal to € 37 billion. A considerable variation across the two methods in risk 
weighted assets due to credit risk is equal to € 835 million. Furthermore, capital requirements, calculated 
for operational risk (Basel II) are equal with € 4 billion, while market risk estimation for both methods is 
marginal. Therefore, the minimum changes introduced by Basel II do not affect significantly the final 
results. Regarding portfolio analysis, high decreases are noticed in three portfolios: (a) The non-default 
small business loan portfolio (weighted Basel II by 75% and Basel I by 100%), equals € 1,7 billion. (b) 
The non-default mortgage loans with low LTV (weighted Basel II by 35% and Basel I by 50%) equal € 
2,3 billion. (c) The non-default consumer loans (weighted Basel II by 75% and Basel I by 100%) equals € 
1,5 billion. On the other hand, an increase in risk weighted assets in defaulted loans appears, with higher 
effect in corporate defaulted loans, whose provisions coverage below 20% equals € 902 million. A 
relative increase occurs for mortgages loans, where loan balance to loan-to-value ratio> 75% is equal to € 
82 million. Operation risk lead to higher risk weighted assets (€ 4 billion). Based on all these 
modifications, a marginal increase of risk weighted assets elements is arising and it is equal to € 835 
million comparing the two methods (2,26% of RWA – Basel I). 
In the second scenario a higher coverage by provisions is taken, which leads to lower risk-weighted 
assets. Higher coverage predictions lead to a reduction of regulatory rates that are applicable to defaulted 
loans. For the three categories of defaulted loans (retail business loans, mortgage loans with LTV <75% 
and consumer loans) the same modification appears (as in the first scenario), equal to € 1,7 billion, € 2,3 
billion and € 1,5 billion, respectively. For business corporate loans modification is equal to zero. For 
corporate defaulted loans portfolios, there is a significant modification equal to € 834 million, which 
leads to an increase of € 492 million, while in the previous scenario; the increase was € 901 million. In 
the second category of defaults, in default mortgage loans (LTV <75%) the € 392 million. Increase is 
limited to € 214 million in this scenario. Finally, with LTV> 75%, of default mortgage loans from € 82 
million, as it was described in the first scenario, a reduction occurs (€ 59 million). The risk weighted 
assets reduction of defaulted loans, due to provisions coverage, leads to a modification equal to € 906,7 
thousands ( marginal change equal to 0% of total assets, on Basel I and Basel II.). 
In the third scenario, risk coverage provisions over 20%, is equal to 61.76%. For the three major 
categories of non-defaulted loans (small businesses loans, mortgages with LTV <75% loans and 
consumer loans), reduction is occurred respectively € 1,7 billion, € 2,3 billion, € 1,5 billion on total risk 
weighted assets. Apart from mortgages with LTV> 75% and provisions over 20%, where a marginal 
increase of € 32 million is occurred, all other defaulted loans variations will be equal to zero. If a capital 
charge for operational risk is also calculated, then the overall reduction of the risk weighted assets is 
equal to € 1 billion or otherwise 2.8% of risk weighted assets as defined by Basel I. 
 
3.4. Bank 3 
For the third representative Bank (Bank 3), the amount of assets is equal to € 24,8 billion, while the 
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Table 4. Bank 3 Risk Weighted Analysis per Portfolio (in thousands Euro) 
        Coverage 0%    Coverage 44,22%     Coverage 88.44% 
Portfolio Type RWA Basel I RWA Basel II RWA Basel I RWA Basel II RWA Basel I RWA Basel II 
Small Enterprises 
(non-defaulted) 
3.029.998 2.272.498 3.029.998 2.272.498 3.029.998 2.272.498 
Small Enterprises 
(defaulted,Coverage<20%) 
113.804 170.707 63.480 95.220 13.155 19.733 
Small Enterprises 
(defaulted,Coverage 20%) 
- - 29.602 29.602 59.205 59.205 
Large Corporate 
(non-defaulted) 
8.787.838 8.787.838 8.787.838 8.787.838 8.787.838 8.787.838 
Large Corporate 
(defaulted,Coverage<20%) 
506.142 759.213 282.326 423.489 58.510 87.765 
Large Corporate 
(defaulted,Coverage>20%) 
- - 136.776 136.776 273.552 273.552 
Mortgage LTV <75% 
(non-defaulted) 
1.353.919 947.743 1.353.919 947.743 1.353.919 947.743 
Mortgage LTV < 75% 
(defaulted,Coverage<20%) 
45.794 91.588 25.544 51.088 5.293 10.587 
Mortgage LTV < 75% 
(defaulted,Coverage 20%) 
- - 17.052 17.052 34.105 34.105 
Mortgage LTV > 75% 
(non-defaulted) 
613.883 920.825 613.883 920.825 613.883 920.825 
Mortgage LTV > 75% 
(defaulted,Coverage<20%) 




- - 14.397 28.794 28.794 7.589 
Retail 
(non-defaulted) 
2.007.165 1.505.373 2.007.165 1.505.373 2.007.165 1.505.373 
Retail 
(defaulted,Coverage<20%) 
256.493 384.740 143.072 214.608 29.650 44.475 
Retail 
(defaulted,Coverage>20%) 
- - 60.046 60.046 120.093 120.093 
Operational Risk - 1.470.158 - 1.470.158 - 1.470.158 
 For the first scenario, where no specific provisions have been made and provisions coverage is less than 
20% (coverage = 0%), for Basel I total weighted assets is equal to € 16,8 billion, while on Basel II is 
equal to € 17,4 billion. Due to the two methods adjustment, the difference in total risk weighted assets for 
credit risk is equal to € 678 million. Capital requirements for operational risk (Basel II) are equal to € 1,5 
billion, while capital requirements for market risk (for both methods) are almost equal. For the three 
major categories of non-defaulted loans, (small businesses loans, mortgages with LTV <75% loans and 
consumer loans), a respectively decrease exists which is equal to € 757 million, € 406 million and € 502 
million of the total weighted assets respectively. Defaulted loans variation will be for small business 
loans equal to € 57 million, for large business loans € 253 million, for mortgage lending loans € 128,3 
million and for consumer loans € 128 million. If a capital charge for operational risk is also calculated, (€ 
1,5 billion), risk weighted assets will increase to € 678 million, (4% increase).  
In the second scenario more provisions have been created against losses, which lead to a reduction in risk 
weighted assets. Higher provision coverage will lead to a reduction of regulatory rates (applicable to 
loans in default). For defaulted loans (retail loans, corporate loans and mortgage lending with LTV <75% 
loans), as in the first scenario, the same improvement occurs which is equal to € 757 million, € 406 
million and € 502 million, respectively. A reduction in the value of risk weighted assets is noticed and 
therefore an advantage for the Bank. In particular, for small business portfolio loan, a reduction is 
occurred from € 57 billion to € 32 billion due to risks that may occur by this type of exposure. Corporate 
and mortgage LTV <75% and consumer portfolio had also reductions in capital requirements € 253 
billion to € 141 billion, € 46 billion to € 26 billion and € 128 billion to € 72 billion, respectively. Finally, 
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in this scenario, an increase is occurred to the weighted assets by 442 million, (2.7% i.e. a percentage 
increase). Therefore, an improvement is noticed over the first scenario, which is equal to € 236.1 million. 
In the third scenario, risk coverage provisions over 20%, is equal to 61.76%. For the three major 
categories of non-defaulted loans (small businesses loans, consumer loans and mortgages with LTV 
<75% loans), reduction is occurred, respectively, € 757 million, € 502 million and € 406 million on total 
risk weighted assets. Apart from provisions, in all defaulted loans, zero or marginal increases of risk 
weighted assets arise. If a capital charge for operational risk is also calculated, (€ 1,5 billion), risk 
weighted assets will increase to € 206 million,(1.25% percentage increase). 
3.5. Relationship between percentage change of weighted assets and the remaining provisions of 
performing loans with the percentage provisions coverage  
From the above analysis that was held for the three representative Banks, it is quite evident that specific 
provisions were created against defaulted exposures, in order to address individual risks, which led to 




Fig 1: Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) Percentage Changes to Provision Coverage Ratio (PCR) 
 
Regulatory framework has certainly put the highest burden of adjustment on Bank 3. Bank 1, based on its 
structure and supervisor’s framework adjustment, has the most accurate risk-weighted assets 
measurement. If optimum coverage is implemented, using special provisions for maximum coverage of 
defaulted loans, Bank 2 is benefited more. Even though Bank 1 maximizes provisions that are booked in 
defaulted exposures, risk weighted assets will remain higher than those of Basel I. It should be noted that 
Bank 1 bear more risks, without satisfactory adequacy of respective provisions to be appeared. Although 
Bank 2 is more burden to Bank 1 with appropriate provisions allocation, risk weighted assets can be 
improved compared to the ones of Bank 1. This is due to sufficient predictions that Bank 2 has made 
compared to Bank 1, and can use them effectively. The reliefs are more in Bank 1 and less in Bank 3 due 
to retail loans portfolio allocation or to fewer defaults that are existed and are "punished" by the 
regulatory framework. 
The higher the ratio of provisions over defaulted loans (above 20%), the lower is the ratio provisions over 
performing loans. In particular, if defaulted loans percentage that is covered by provisions over 20% is 
equal to 30%, then the remaining provisions that are allocated to performing loans will be equal: (i) 
150% for Bank 1. (ii) 480% for Bank 2. (iii) 290% for Bank 3. If the coverage provision ratio increases, 
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Fig 2: Percentage Changes of Residual Provision Ratio (RPR) to Provision Coverage Ratio (PCR) 
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
Reduction overall capital requirements under the standardized approach for all three (representative) 
Banks was implied due to credit risk (vs Basel I). This reduction was mainly occurred in retail and 
mortgage portfolios. The above mentioned improvement was hedged by the capital requirements due to 
operational risk. The final level of capital requirements improvement may be accomplished by specific 
provisions allocation for loans that were defaulted. If provisions coverage is low, then for the three 
representative Banks, higher capital requirements will be occurred (in relation to Basel I). Bank 1, in this 
case, incurs lower increase, while Bank 3 has the higher one. If coverage rate increases, capital 
requirements for all three banks will be reduced. 
For the quantitative analysis that was conducted, the below issues were concluded: Bank 1 in the first 
scenario, which corresponds to low coverage of special provisions, has a marginal increase in risk 
weighted assets (0.66%). For the second scenario, which corresponds to an average coverage of special 
provisions, risk weighted assets were equal to zero. In the third scenario, where coverage of specific 
provisions was adequate, risk weighted assets were decreased by 0.63%. Risk weighted assets for Bank 2 
were increased, for the first scenario (2.26%), while in the second scenario the increase was equal to 
zero. For the third scenario, risk weighted assets were decreased by 1.25%. Finally, for Bank 3 an 
increase in risk weighted assets is observed in the first scenario (4%), lower in the second one (2.7%) 
while the lowest is in the third scenario (1.25%). Based on these increases, capital adequacy ratio is 
accordingly affected. For all Banks, the greatest relief is observed to mortgage, consumer and SME 
portfolios. The relief is due to the risk weight of performing mortgages loans (35% from 50%-Basel I) 
and performing retail loans (75% from 100%-Basel I).  
Banks focusing on retail (such as Bank 2) are likely to benefit the most, due to risk weighting based on 
theoretical issues, which is contrary to study’s results. This conclusion could be driven by the additional 
capital requirements of non-performing loans and operational risk that are hedging this relief. Retail 
loans, excluding mortgages, include more loan loss provisions. Moreover, capital requirements due to 
operational risk were increased due to the spread that these loans have.  
According to the study, capital ratio is calculated, as for standardized approach, with the below factors 
(order of priority): (a) Exposures by type of assets (b) Collateral allocation, especially for individuals’ 
property (c) Defaulted loans percentage. Special provisions due to delinquent and bad debt may decrease 
defaulted loans charges and relevant risk weights (as in Basel I level). 
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